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Vollman: Keeping up with the Commutations

KEEPING UP WITH THE COMMUTATIONS:
THE JUDICIARY’S AUTHORITY AFTER AN EXERCISE OF
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
Brianna Vollman*

“So grateful to @realDonaldTrump, Jared Kushner & to everyone
who has showed compassion & contributed countless hours to this
important moment for Ms. Alice Marie Johnson. Her commutation is
inspirational & gives hope to so many others who are also deserving of a
second chance.”1
- Kim Kardashian West
I. INTRODUCTION
The unlikely pair of President Donald Trump and Kim Kardashian
West recently brought the executive clemency power into news
headlines.2 Widely known reality TV star Kardashian West has used her
platform since 2018 to lobby for criminal rights reform, inspired by her
late father, the famous O.J. Simpson trial attorney, Robert Kardashian.3
Kardashian West successfully lobbied President Donald Trump for
inmate Alice Marie Johnson’s sentence commutation in 2018.4
Kardashian West spoke at the White House as recently as October 19,
2019, pleading for a clemency grant for Julius Jones, a death row inmate.5
Kardashian West took action on behalf of Julius Jones after the Supreme
Court of the United States rejected his appeal in April 2019, which
accused a juror of racial discrimination.6 Kardashian West specifically
has used her Twitter platform to instantly reach over 62 million followers
* University of Cincinnati Law Review, Associate Member
1. Kim Kardashian West (@KimKardashian), TWITTER, (June 6, 2018, 1:18 PM)
https://tinyurl.com/y4vqo3rz [https://perma.cc/WPM5-TA7Z].
2. Michelle Mark, Here are all the people Trump has pardoned so far — and who he could choose
next, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 9, 2019, 1:28 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/who-has-trumppardoned-so-far-arpaio-johnson-scooter-libby-2018-5 [https://perma.cc/J7FS-7R2M].
3. Kaitlyn Frey, Kim Kardashian Read Dad Robert's O.J. Simpson Trial Evidence Books as a
Teen, PEOPLE.COM (Sept. 12, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://people.com/tv/kim-kardashian-read-dad-ojsimpson-evidence-books/ [https://perma.cc/JU53-9PSF].
4. Jane C. Timm, Trump commutes sentence of grandmother serving life on drug charges after
Kim
Kardashian
meeting,
NBC
NEWS
(June
6,
2018,
4:44
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-commutes-sentence-grandmother-serving-lifedrug-charges-after-kim-n880291 [https://perma.cc/4QT6-6J5D].
5. Associated Press, Kim Kardashian urges clemency for Oklahoma death row inmate, ABC
NEWS (October 17, 2019, 6:20 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/kim-kardashian-urgesclemency-oklahoma-death-row-inmate-66350107 [https://perma.cc/L9Q2-JTCD].
6. Id.
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and has brought what she feels are apparent injustices to light.7
Presidential commutation of inmate sentences is not a new concept, of
course.8 President Barack Obama’s “Fair Sentencing Act” commuted
many sentences which led some news outlets to label him the “Commuterin-Chief.”9 After an initial commutation though, cases arose in the lower
courts dealing with collateral attacks on already commuted sentences.10
Many of these cases have just recently reached the federal circuit courts,
revealing an explicit disagreement between the Fourth Circuit and Sixth
Circuit.11 These circuit courts disagree on whether an act of executive
clemency divests the courts of authority over the criminal sentence, or
whether the courts can still entertain collateral attacks on the original
sentence.12 The answer to this question remains important as more
Obama-era commuted inmates collaterally attack their original sentences
and as Trump-era inmates do the same. In modern times, the executive
clemency power is seemingly viewed as a shortcut to achieving justice.13
As former U.S. Pardon Attorney Margaret Colgate Love explained, “[n]o
legal system should have to rely on executive clemency to do justice, but
ours does.”14
Part II of this Article examines the history of the clemency power and
the implications that the power holds for the courts’ jurisdiction over
criminal sentences in federal courts. Next, Part II shifts to review the
current jurisprudence of federal circuit courts on the issue of judicial
authority over commuted sentences. Part III then argues that a presidential
commutation does not divest courts of authority over the case because the
case law is moving toward this conclusion and because the doctrines of
mootness and separation of powers embrace this conclusion. Part III ends
with a brief overview of possible implications and solutions to the
7. Id.
8. A presidential commutation is a "substitution of a punishment of a different character for that
which has been awarded by the court." S. Elizabeth Gibson, Constitutional Law -- Presidential Pardons
and the Common Law, 53 N.C. L. REV. 785, 790 (1975) (quoting Peter Brett, Conditional Pardons and
the Commutation of Death Sentences, 20 MOD. L. REV. 131 (1957)).
9. Tyler Durden, Commuter-In-Chief: Obama Sets New Single-Day Clemency Record; More
Than Previous 11 Presidents Combined, ZEROHEDGE (Dec. 19, 2016, 10:15 PM),
https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-12-19/commuter-chief-obama-sets-new-single-day-clemencyrecord-more-previous-11-presidents [https://perma.cc/5ZBX-K6L7].
10. A collateral attack is an attack on a prior judgment in a new case (i.e., not by direct appeal).
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/collateral_attack
Collateral
attack,
LEGAL INFO. INST.,
[https://perma.cc/EN87-4E9K]. See also United States v. Surrat, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017); Dennis v
Terry, 927 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2019); Dennis v. Terry, 927 F.3d 955, 957-58 (6th Cir. 2019).
11. United States v. Surrat, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017); Dennis v Terry, 927 F.3d 955 (6th Cir.
2019); Dennis v. Terry, 927 F.3d 955, 957-58 (6th Cir. 2019).
12. Id.
13. Margaret Colgate Love, Reinventing the President's Pardon Power, 20 FED. SENT. R. 5, 5
(2007).
14. Id.
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imperfections of the current clemency power. Part IV concludes by
calling upon Congress to take more vigorous action for criminal justice
reform.
II. BACKGROUND
Part II-A briefly summarizes the extensive history and evolution of the
executive clemency power. Part II-B then discusses the relevance of the
doctrines of mootness and separation of powers to the executive clemency
inquiry. Then, Part II-C focuses on the current federal circuit split on the
issue of whether an act of executive clemency divests the courts of
authority over the sentence, or whether the courts can still entertain
collateral attacks on the original sentence.
A. History of the Clemency Power
The institution of clemency has roots in ancient Rome and Greece
where grants of clemency focused more on the political popularity of the
pardoned as opposed to justice.15 Centuries later, early England
incorporated the idea of clemency into varying codes that placed
wrongdoers at the mercy of monarchs.16 Under the criminal justice system
of ninth-century England, being pardoned by the king was the only path
to justice for the innocent, which led to excessive use and haphazard
application of clemency grants.17 Further, only those who could pay for a
pardon received one.18 Although ineffective in bringing justice to the
innocent, English common law greatly affected the institution of
clemency in the Thirteen Colonies.19
In the Thirteen Colonies, the King of England delegated power to royal
colonial governors, and a variation of the power to pardon was
enumerated in each colony’s respective governing document.20 After the
adoption of the Declaration of Independence, the pardoning power was
entrusted to the local governor, state legislatures, the legislative body, or
a combination of the three, most likely because early colonists distrusted
centralized power in one executive.21 A provision containing the
15. Daniel T. Kobil, Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69
TEX. L. REV. 569 (1991).
16. William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 475, 476 (1977).
17. Id. at 479.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 497.
20. Paul F. Eckstein & Mikaela Colby, Presidential Pardon Power: Are There Limits and, If Not,
Should There Be, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 71, 76 (2019).
21. Id.
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executive’s power to pardon was included in neither the Virginia Plan nor
the New Jersey Plan at the Constitutional Convention, but instead
spawned from Alexander Hamilton’s suggested amendments to the
Virginia Plan which were included in the Committee of Detail’s drafts.22
This version included an impeachment limitation and was adopted into
the final text and is the same Article II, Section II, Clause 1 found in the
United States Constitution today.23
The pardoning clause states: “. . . [The President] shall have Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States,
except in Cases of Impeachment.”24 The first Supreme Court case
discussing the power to pardon was United States v. Wilson.25 In Wilson,
the Court determined that a person did not have to accept a pardon, and if
they did not, the Court could not force the pardon upon the person who
received it.26 Within the opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall described a
presidential pardon as “an act of grace.”27 Supreme Court jurisprudence
suggests that the power to pardon is indeed a plenary one28: a power that
neither Congress nor the federal courts can usurp, and any limitation on
the power must come from the Constitution itself.29 President William
Howard Taft articulated the only practical limitation: the president may
not exercise this power against the public interest.30
Formal rules were not developed regarding the process of granting
clemency until President William McKinley in 1898 directed that all
clemency requests be processed through a Congress-funded Pardon
Attorney working within the Department of Justice.31 Pardons became
less frequent during the Carter and Reagan Administrations, and
continued to steadily decline through the Bush Administration.32 This
drop-off in clemency grants may be attributed to the delegation of
clemency petition review to the Deputy Attorney General, from the
Attorney General, at the end of the Carter Administration.33 This
delegation to a lower position severed the direct line to the president; now,
22. Id. at 77.
23. Id. at 79.
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
25. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
26. Id. at 161.
27. Id. at 160.
28. Jonathan T. Menitove, The Problematic Presidential Pardon: A Proposal for Reforming
Federal Clemency, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 449, 451 (2009).
29. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974).
30. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 121 (1915).
31. Mark Osler, Fewer Hands, More Mercy: A Plea for a Better Federal Clemency System, 41 VT.
L. REV. 465, 472 (2017).
32. Id. at 473. See also Clemency Statistics, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFF. OF THE PARDON ATT’Y,
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-statistics [https://perma.cc/M6KJ-PEX4].
33. Osler, supra note 31, at 473-74.
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the clemency process has to first go through White House Staff, involving
over seven levels of review.34 The complicated process has some critics
calling for creation of a Presidential Clemency Board,35 which may in
itself pose a separation of powers issue due to over-regulation by
Congress of an executive plenary power.36 Regardless of the solution,
critics agree that a reform that creates transparency and accountability in
the clemency process would benefit the criminal justice system.37
This need for reform comes amidst a backdrop of presidential abuse of
the pardoning power, which consistently causes public outcry. For
example, in 1974, unelected President Gerald Ford gave previous
President Richard Nixon a full and complete pardon, allowing Nixon to
completely subvert any punishment for the serious offenses committed
during his presidency.38 President George H. W. Bush pardoned six White
House officials who were involved in the Iran-Contra scandal, and his son
President George W. Bush commuted the criminal sentence of I. Lewis
“Scooter” Libby, who was Vice President Dick Cheney’s former Chief of
Staff.39 Pardons and commutations such as these cause critics to believe
that the pardoning power is used to pursue the president’s personal or
political goals, as opposed to being used to pursue justice for the innocent
or fairness within the courts.40
Although the potential for abuse persists, some pardons are well
intentioned. In 2014, President Barack Obama launched a clemency
initiative focused on commuting sentences of non-violent, low-level
offenders.41 Specifically, the Department of Justice announced that
applicants who met the following criteria would be prioritized: (1) the
inmate is currently serving a federal sentence in prison and has served at
least ten years of her/his sentence; (2) the inmate likely would have
received a substantially lower sentence if convicted of the same offense(s)
under the guidelines in effect today; (3) the inmate is a non-violent, lowlevel offender without significant ties to large scale criminal
organizations, gangs or cartels and without a significant criminal history;
and (4) the inmate has demonstrated good conduct in prison and has no
34. Id. at 477.
35.See Menitove, supra note 28, at 457. See also Osler, supra note 31, at 499.
36. Paul J. Jr. Larkin, Revitalizing the Clemency Process, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 833, 904
(2016).
37. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Congressional Control of Presidential Pardons, 2 NEV. L.J.F. 31, 36
(2017).
38. Ronald J. Glick, The Presidential Pardon: A Call to Amend a Constitutional Error, 1 S.U. L.
REV. 153, 159 (1975).
39. Menitove, supra note 28, at 448.
40. Colgate Love, supra note 13, at 12.
41. Sanjay K. Chhablani, Legitimate Justice: Using Clemency to Address Mass Incarceration, 16
U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 48, 50-51 (2016).
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history of violence prior to or during the current term of imprisonment.42
Although the initiative did not define these terms or specifically target
drug offenders, the sentences of drug offenders were most applicable
because the sentences were generally longer than ten years and were also
non-violent.43 Violent offenders did not qualify, while property and public
order crimes often did not warrant more than ten years’ imprisonment.44
Over 30,000 inmates responded, driving the American Bar Association to
create “Clemency Project 2014” to provide free counsel to screen
inmates.45 Although the process was slowed by bureaucracy46, President
Barack Obama commuted 1,715 prison sentences by the end of his
presidency.47
In recent years, presidents are highly influenced by the positive public
reactions exhibited via the press or social media. Reality TV star Kim
Kardashian West brought a particular inmate to President Donald
Trump’s attention in 2018.48 The president received praise for commuting
the sentence of Alice Marie Johnson, a low-level drug offender who was
also a grandmother.49 Not all of the president’s commutations have hailed
praise, however; specifically, he faced backlash for pardoning Sheriff Joe
Arpaio who had been convicted of criminal contempt.50 Regardless, the
potential for backlash has not stopped President Donald Trump from
taking an even more expansive view of the pardoning power than his
predecessors.51
B. The Mootness and Separation of Powers Inquiry
Contemporary scholars view the expansive pardoning power as one of
the executive’s checks on the legislative and judicial branches.52 But some
scholars believe the judiciary also should have a check on the executive’s
42. Announcing New Clemency Initiative, Deputy Attorney General James M Cole Details Broad
New Criteria for Applicants, DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFF. OF PUB. AFFAIRS (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/announcing-new-clemency-initiative-deputy-attorney-general-james-mcole-details-broad-new [https://perma.cc/HJ4U-TVA8].
43. Chhablani, supra note 42, at 51.
44. Id. at 51-52.
45. Id. at 53-54.
46. Lorelei Laird, Clemency Calling, 103 A.B.A. J. 18, 19 (2017).
47. Clemency Initiative, DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFF. OF THE PARDON ATT’Y,
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-initiative [https://perma.cc/3BP4-KR4R].
48. Executive
Grant
of
Clemency,
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE
(June
6,
2018)
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/page/file/1068926/download [https://perma.cc/X6HU-DQKB].
49. Id.; see also Timm, supra note 4.
50. Eckstein & Colby, supra note 20, at 91.
51. Id. at 88.
52. Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 802, 831 (2015).
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pardoning power to ensure that a pardon complies with other provisions
of the Constitution.53 Regardless, judicial review can disturb neither the
grant nor denial of clemency on the merits based upon the essential facts
of the case.54 Rather, the judiciary can determine whether a president’s
motivation complied with the Constitution. For example, the judiciary can
review the grant or denial of clemency to ensure the president was not
using the power in a racially-discriminatory manner.55 The consensus
among scholars seems to be that any reform or any action by the courts or
Congress should be viewed through the lens of separation of powers to
ensure compliance with the Constitution.56
Judicial review of a presidential grant of clemency brings forth another
concern: mootness of an offender’s claim. Under the mootness doctrine,
an offender who is released may be precluded from challenging the
original sentence because the offender already finished serving his
sentence and therefore has no concrete interest in the collateral attack
being heard.57 Some commentators believe that a president’s
commutation should not deprive the offender of an opportunity to
collaterally attack his original sentence for unconstitutionality.58 A
commutation that swaps a shorter sentence for the originally imposed
sentence may still be less effective for serving justice than a total judicial
reversal of an improper or unconstitutional sentence.59
C. The Circuit Split
Federal courts are split over whether a presidential commutation
effectively divests the courts of authority over a criminal sentence.
Specifically, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits disagree on this question.60 In
2017, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Surrat determined that a
“president’s commutation order simply closes the judicial door.”61 In
Surrat, the petitioner was convicted of multiple crack cocaine offenses,
which at the time were considered “felony drug offenses” and led a
53. Kobil, supra note 15, at 616.
54. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561, 594
(2001).
55. Kobil, supra note 15, at 617; see also Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President's
Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1665, 1705 (2001) (arguing that judges should be able to
check abuse of a presidential pardon when the situation shocks the conscious of society or when an
offender challenges the constitutionality of a condition placed on a commutation or pardon).
56. Hoffstadt, supra note 54, at 635.
57. Postrelease Remedies for Wrongful Conviction, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1615, 1615-16 (1961).
58. Id. at 1617.
59. Id.
60. United States v. Surrat, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017); Dennis v Terry, 927 F.3d 955 (6th Cir.
2019).
61. Surrat, 855 F.3d at 219.
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sentence of life in prison.62 Five years later, Congress passed the Fair
Sentencing Act (“FSA”), 63 which reduced the sentence for crack cocaine
offenses to a ten-year mandatory minimum if at least one prior conviction
was a “felony drug offense.”64 Importantly, the FSA retroactively applied
these more lenient mandatory minimums to offenders whose unlawful
acts took place before the FSA was passed.65
Based on the revised sentencing guidelines found in the FSA, the
petitioner moved for rehearing when President Obama commuted his life
imprisonment sentence to a 200-month term of imprisonment.66 The
Fourth Circuit ruled that the president’s commutation mooted the
petitioner’s collateral attack on the length of his sentence.67 Judge J.
Harvie Wilkinson, in a concurring opinion to the dismissal on the grounds
of mootness, explained that the court may not readjust the president’s
commutation.68 Emphasizing the president’s lawful exercise of the
pardoning power, the court considered the pardon a new “presidentially
commuted sentence” that the court had no authority over, and thus
dismissed the petitioner’s appeal.69 Further, the president’s commutation
was a “final judgment” and mercifully brought the petitioner’s “saga to
an end.”70 A year later in Blount v. Clarke, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed
the ruling in Surrat, further solidifying the Fourth Circuit’s view that a
presidential commutation divests the courts of authority over a sentence.71
Judge James Wynn dissented in Surrat, arguing that the case was not
moot because the petitioner retained a concrete interest in the resolution
of the case even after the commutation.72 Had the sentence not been
commuted, the petitioner would have to serve several more years.73 On
the other hand, if the court had heard the case, the case would have been
remanded for resentencing consistent with the FSA, and the petitioner
would have been released because his time served exceeded the upper end
of the new sentencing guidelines.74 Further, the Judge Wynn disagreed
with the concurring opinion’s reasoning that the sentence becomes a new

62. Id. at 222 (Wynn, C.J., dissenting).
63.Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).
64. Surrat, 855 F.3d at 222-23 (Wynn, C.J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 223.
66. Id. at 224.
67. Id. at 219.
68. Id. at 219-20 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 220.
71. Blount v. Clarke, 890 F.3d 456, 462-63 (4th Cir. 2018).
72. United States v. Surrat, 855 F.3d 218, 221(4th Cir. 2017) (Wynn, C.J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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presidentially-commuted one.75 He explained that the president cannot
impose a sentence on anyone, and that the judgment remained the
judgment of the court.76 Because the petitioner had the right to collaterally
attack his original sentence, the case was not mooted by the president’s
commutation, and the court should be able to remedy its own errors.77 The
dissent relied heavily on the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Simpson v.
Battaglia to argue that, because the petitioner would face a lesser sentence
if the petitioner prevailed on the collateral attack, the petitioner retained
the right to seek relief.78
Two years after the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Surrat, the Sixth
Circuit explicitly disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning and
determined that a commutation does not deny an offender opportunity to
seek judicial relief from a potentially unconstitutional sentence.79 In
Dennis v. Terry, the President Obama commuted an inmate’s life sentence
to a 30 year sentence.80 To properly accept this commutation, the inmate
had to enroll in a residential drug program, thus making this a conditional
commutation.81 The petitioner enrolled and received the commutation.82
The petitioner then filed a habeas petition arguing that he should have
only been subject to a 20-year mandatory sentence in the first place.83
Although the court eventually dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on the
merits, the court determined that the commutation did not render his
habeas petition moot.84 The court first reasoned that the president’s ability
to place conditions on commutation supports the federal court’s continued
jurisdiction over a commuted sentence because, if the offender violates
the condition, the commutation would be rescinded and the offender
would be returned to prison to serve the rest of his time, sans
commutation.85 A commutation is merely swapping out the judicially
imposed sentence with a lesser one, the court noted.86 The court
emphasized that the sentence remains primarily a judicially imposed
one,87 and that the possibility that the petitioner’s sentence might be

75. Id. at 221.
76. Id. at 221-22, 230.
77. Id. at 228-29.
78. Id. at 226 (citing Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 595 (7th Cir. 2006)).
79. Dennis v. Terry, 927 F.3d 955, 957-58 (6th Cir. 2019).
80. Id. at 957.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 957, 961.
85. Id. at 958 (citing Vitale v. Hunter, 206 F.2d 826, 829 (10th Cir. 1953)).
86. Id.
87.Id. (citing Duehay v. Thompson, 223 F. 305, 307-08 (9th Cir. 1915)).
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reduced is a sufficient concrete interest to make the dispute non-moot.88
Notably, the Sixth Circuit partially agrees with the Fourth Circuit on
the issue of whether the sentence remains a judicial one.89 In Dennis, the
Sixth Circuit noted that the sentence is carried out by the executive branch
and that branch retains authority to commute it, a conclusion that is in line
with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning.90 However, the Sixth Circuit
continued by explaining that the altered sentence is not free from judicial
scrutiny in regard to any mistakes the courts may have made.91 While the
court cannot alter a president’s commutation (unless unconstitutional),
the courts may still hear collateral attacks.92 The opinion in Dennis
specifically notes that the decision is at odds with the Fourth Circuit and
points out the lack of clarity in the Fourth Circuit’s brief opinion.93
Although the Sixth Circuit is the only court to expressly discuss the
circuit split, other courts have ruled on cases after a presidential
commutation, leading to similar conclusions on the issue of mootness.
The Seventh Circuit in Simpson v. Battaglia continued with a habeas
petition even after a governor’s commutation, determining that the
commutation did not moot the action.94 The Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Hearst determined that the case was not rendered moot even though
President Barack Obama had commuted the petitioner’s sentence.95
Courts have also dealt with the question that the Fourth and Sixth
Circuit partially agreed on whether a commutation replaces a judicial
sentence with an executive one. The Ninth Circuit weighed in on this
issue, determining that a presidential commutation does not create a new
judgment.96 The court explained that the only way to create a new
sentence is to legally invalidate the prior judgment.97 This echoes the
Ninth Circuit’s 1915 decision in Duehay v. Thompson: “In short, the
executive has superimposed its mind upon the judgment of the court; but
the sentence remains, nevertheless, the judgment of the court[.]”98
Finally, in Robson v. United States the First Circuit determined that the
petitioner’s release from custody did not preclude his ability to seek
review of the constitutionality of the original sentence.99
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 959.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 960.
Id. (citing United States v. Surrat, 855 F.3d 218, 219 (4th Cir. 2017)).
Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 595 (7th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1192, n.1 (9th Cir. 1980)
United States v. Buenrostro, 895 F.3d 1160, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2018)
Id. at 1166.
Duehay v. Thompson, 223 F. 305, 307-08 (9th Cir. 1915).
Robson v. United States, 526 F.2d 1145, 1147 (1st Cir. 1975).
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In short, the federal circuit courts are split on whether a presidential
commutation of a criminal sentence divests the courts of authority over
the criminal sentence. This is highly relevant in light of President Donald
Trump’s expansive application of the pardoning power. Additionally,
more Obama-era petitioners who had their sentences commuted may
attempt to collaterally attack their original sentences. Therefore, this
power struggle between the courts and the executive will remain relevant
for years to come.
III. DISCUSSION
This Part argues that the weight of relevant case law supports the
conclusion that the courts are not divested of authority over a sentence,
even after a presidential commutation. First, Part III-A highlights the
flaws of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Surrat.100 Part III-B then discusses
arguments supporting the judiciary’s retainment of authority over a
presidentially commuted criminal sentence, including the issues of
mootness and separation of powers. Finally, Part III-C discusses possible
implications of this conclusion and the possible solutions to the current
imperfections of executive clemency.
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Surrender
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Surratt evidences the scant justification
for divesting the courts of such authority. First and foremost, the infirmity
of the Fourth Circuit’s position is exemplified by the woefully short
majority opinion. The opinion is three sentences:
By order dated February 14, 2017, the court directed the parties to address
the impact of the President’s commutation of Appellant Surratt’s sentence
and, in particular, the questions of mootness and jurisdiction. Upon
consideration of the responses to the court’s order, the court finds this
appeal moot. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed as moot.101

The concurring opinions also leave much to be desired by way of
explanation. The concurring Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson explains, briefly,
that the offender now serves a presidentially imposed sentence that the
judiciary may not touch.102 What is even more disheartening is that this
particular concurring opinion uses the purpose of “finality” as an excuse
to cut off judicial authority.103 The concurring opinion almost

100.
101.
102.
103.

United States v. Surrat, 855 F.3d 218, 219 (4th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id. at 220 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
Id.
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condescendingly shames the dissenting opinion by stating, “Some reason
is somehow always found for a case to go on and on and on.”104
This sentiment is wholly misguided. What better reason is there for a
case to continue than the possibility that justice will finally prevail? In
Surratt, had the court not given up jurisdiction, the case would have been
remanded and the offender would have most likely walked free because
he had already served the mandatory length of the commuted sentence.
Although this remand and rehearing would have taken more time, the
final outcome would have been better for the inmate. The inmate would
have, on a whole, served less time. More importantly, he would no longer
have served an improper sentence.
The dissent correctly explains that a presidential commutation only
partially remedied the court’s errors. The FSA was used to sweep with a
broad brush, commuting many sentences, but not giving each case close
scrutiny. When the executive branch commutes a class of inmate
sentences, the likelihood that there will still be issues with the original
sentences remains. This method of commutation, although effective in
commuting the highest amount of sentences in one stroke, does not give
each case as much scrutiny as needed and likely does not fully serve
justice. The Obama Administration recognized this in a blog written by
the former Counsel to the President: “Only Congress can achieve the
broader reforms needed to ensure over the long run that our criminal
justice system operates more fairly and effectively in the service of public
safety.”105
Surrat illustrates this perfectly: while the FSA indeed made Surratt’s
sentence shorter, he was still sentenced incorrectly in the first place. This
original injustice remains unremedied.
Next, the history of clemency illustrates that the purpose of the power
has always been mercy. Chief Justice John Marshall described the
exercise of the clemency power as “an act of grace.”106 The Fourth Circuit
seemingly ignored the prerogative of mercy in its decision. The
concurring opinion sidesteps the issue of the original unlawful sentence
by saying that “it was indisputably lawful when entered and the
correctness has divided judges ever since.” Thus, it appears the Fourth
Circuit divested itself of jurisdiction simply because the case is difficult.
Further, the sentence may have been “lawful” when imposed, but the FSA
was applied retroactively, meaning that the once-lawful sentence was no
104. Id.
105. Neil Eggleston, President Obama Has Now Granted More Commutations than Any President
in this Nation’s History, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (Jan. 17, 2017, 4:17 PM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2017/01/17/president-obama-has-now-granted-morecommutations-any-president-nations-history [https://perma.cc/J8GL-HAS6].
106. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833).
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longer lawful. If mercy and grace historically are at the heart of clemency
grants, it follows that should a presidential commutation fall short of
wholly doing justice, the courts still retain authority to deliver justice.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit’s decision kept the petitioner in prison
longer by refusing to exercise authority over the sentence and to remand
the case for resentencing. This matters because of the psychological
effects of incarceration. Although not every inmate reacts to incarceration
the same way, many inmates “suffer long-term consequences from having
been subjected to pain, deprivation, and extremely atypical patterns and
norms of living and interacting with others.”107 In line with clemency’s
mercy motivation, no inmate should serve more time than Congress has
deemed appropriate for his or her crime. The inmate in the Fourth
Circuit’s decision most likely would have walked free had the court
simply remanded his case. But instead, the Court surrendered jurisdiction.
Further, parental incarceration has significant adverse effects on
children. Parental incarceration significantly increases the likelihood of
antisocial behavior, poor mental health, drug use, school failure, and
unemployment.108 Thus, parental imprisonment has shown to be a strong
predictor of multiple adverse outcomes for children.109 These two
examples are illustrative of the importance of courts retaining authority
over criminal sentences to ensure that no inmate serves more time than
deserved.
The sentiments of finality and respect for a president’s particular
exercise of clemency do not outweigh the true purpose of clemency:
justice and mercy. Further, the sentiments do not outweigh the collateral,
adverse effects on not only the inmates, but also the children of those
inmates. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion and the supporting concurring
opinions fall woefully short of justifying their surrender of jurisdiction
and are incorrect.
B. Retainment of Jurisdiction and Supporting Explanations
The Fourth Circuit’s Surratt and Blount v. Clarke opinions are some of
the only pieces of case law that support the conclusion that the court is
divested of authority over a sentence once it has been commuted by an
executive, thus rendering the case moot. Having already pointed out the

107. Craig Haney, Off. of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, The Psychological
Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison Adjustment, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS. (Dec. 1, 2001), https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/psychological-impact-incarcerationimplications-post-prison-adjustment [https://perma.cc/6APF-3AXQ].
108. Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, The Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Children, 37
CRIME AND JUST. 133, 186-87 (2008).
109. Id. at 187.
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issues with the Fourth Circuit’s brief justifications, arguments that
support the opposite conclusion need to be examined. This Section
discusses multiple considerations supporting the conclusion that courts
should retain authority over a sentence even after a presidential
commutation. Subsection (a) discusses the mootness inquiry; Subsection
(b) discusses the idea of the sentence becoming an executively-imposed
one; Subsection (c) discusses separation of powers; and finally,
Subsection (d) discusses the ideal of mercy that underlies the clemency
power.
1. Mootness
The Sixth Circuit correctly emphasized that if a party retains a
concrete interest in the outcome of the case, the case is not moot. The
mootness doctrine is an issue of Constitutional law. The role of the
judiciary is to resolve live disputes, and the mootness doctrine ensures
that the court does not waste its time hearing cases where no one is
adverse to one another and where there is no true dispute of law or fact.
If these principles are accurately applied to collateral attacks of original,
pre-commutation sentences, it becomes clear that these cases are not
moot.
A defendant retains a concrete interest in the resolution of the case
when there are still grounds for a defendant to seek a lower term of
imprisonment. In Surratt, the petitioner’s original sentence was most
likely incorrect, and therefore, the court should have remanded instead of
dismissing the collateral attack. Had the court chosen this route, the
petitioner would have most likely walked free instead of remaining
behind bars. The state and the petitioner remain adverse to one another so
long as the validity of the original sentence can be attacked in some way.
The Sixth Circuit in Dennis used this line of reasoning: “All of this means
that Dennis may challenge his original sentence because, if he wins, the
district court might sentence him to a term less than his current 30-year
commuted sentence.”110
The Seventh Circuit in Simpson similarly concluded that a
commutation does not preclude a defendant’s ability to challenge the
original sentence.111 Even though the Governor commuted a death
sentence to life imprisonment, the defendant still had an opportunity to
seek a mandatory minimum sentence under the statute as opposed to the
life sentence.112 In this situation, the state and the inmate remain adverse
to one another, and the defendant holds a concrete interest in trading his
110. Dennis v. Terry, 927 F.3d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2019).
111. Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 595 (7th Cir. 2006).
112. Id. at 586.
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commuted sentence for an even shorter one due to some issue with the
original sentence. Dismissal of the mootness inquiry was so obvious for
the Ninth Circuit that the inquiry in one case received no more discussion
than a single-sentence footnote. In Hearst, the court dismissed the issue
of mootness quickly by pointing out that the district court will have the
power to vacate the defendant’s conviction if deemed appropriate.113 If an
inmate is asserting a collateral attack, then the state and the inmate are
indeed adverse, and the case is not moot.
2. Judicial or Executive Sentence?
The Fourth Circuit claimed that a commuted sentence becomes an
executive sentence, thus divesting the courts of authority. The Sixth
Circuit disagreed. However, the two opinions are not completely at odds
with one another.
The majority opinion in Dennis explains that because of the common
use of conditional commutations, “the [judicially imposed] judgment
remains in place, ready to kick into full effect if the recipient violates the
conditional cap.”114 A commutation merely swaps the longer sentence for
a shorter one. Thus, the sentence remains a judicially-imposed one. The
opinion in Dennis then stated, “The executive branch, not the judicial
branch, executes the sentence, and the President retains authority,
constitutional authority, to lower it or end it or eliminate the conviction
altogether.”115 This particular assertion is not completely at odds with the
Fourth Circuit. The opinion in Dennis then states, “Yet this does not mean
that the altered sentence becomes an executive sentence in full, free from
judicial scrutiny with respect to mistakes the courts may have made.”116
This statement explains that the Dennis opinion did not go so far as to say
that there is no executive element to an inmate’s new commuted sentence.
But the Sixth Circuit, unlike the Fourth Circuit, did not believe that the
executive element of a commuted sentence gives any reason for the courts
to be unable to hear a collateral attack.
Note also that the Ninth Circuit in Duehay explicitly reached the
conclusion that the judicial sentence remains even if the president
commutes the original sentence.117
It does not matter how the new commuted sentence is labelled. The
Fourth Circuit’s dissent and the Sixth Circuit agree that in no instance
does a commutation strip a defendant of his or her right to attack his or
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 1980).
Dennis, 927 F.3d at 958.
Id. at 959.
Id.
Duehay v. Thompson, 223 F. 305, 307-08 (9th Cir. 1915).
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her sentence collaterally. This conclusion wholly respects the president’s
plenary clemency power, while still upholding a petitioner’s right to relief
from a potentially unconstitutional original sentence.
3. Separation of Powers
The doctrine of separation of powers also supports a conclusion
that courts should retain authority over a case after a presidential
commutation. The clemency power is one of the president’s plenary
powers, which means the judiciary cannot infringe upon it. It follows that
the only reason a court may review a commuted sentence is if the
commuted sentence was unconstitutional in some way or if the court is
seeking to review the original sentence for mistakes made by the courts.118
The court may only review the actual substance of a commutation if its
constitutionality is being questioned. The court may only look at the
substance of collateral attacks on the original, judicially imposed sentence
and choose whether to grant relief.
The legislative branch cannot be forgotten. Congress, not the
executive branch, is granted the authority to define crimes and
punishments. Therefore, the courts must faithfully apply sentencing laws
as Congress provides. To illustrate, in Surratt, the FSA applied
retroactively to crimes that occurred before the FSA was passed. It would
be an infringement on separations of powers for the court not to hear a
collateral attack on the petitioner’s original sentence that was
subsequently altered by the FSA.
The president has no constitutional authority to impose any
sentence. He may alter sentences as he pleases, exercising his plenary
power, but the judiciary has the job of imposing sentencing guidelines set
by Congress. In this way, courts retaining authority over presidentially
commuted sentences protect the doctrine of separation of powers.
4. Mercy Motivation
A commutation is an act of mercy from the president. The
president’s only motivation, if exercised correctly without abuse, should
be to do justice or to give deserved second chances. Therefore, the court
furthers this motivation by continuing to entertain collateral attacks even
after a commutation. For example, the judiciary’s retainment of authority
is in the interest of justice if an individual still wishes to challenge the
original sentence on the basis of a racially biased juror, or the like. In
Surrat, the court declared the collateral attack moot due to the president’s
118. Dennis, 927 F.3d at 959 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
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commutation and thus denied the inmate the possibility of walking free
had his case been remanded. If the goal is mercy, there is no justification
for the courts to deny the right of a defendant to collaterally attack the
original sentence.
C. Implications
Although not every circuit has squarely faced the issue of whether a
presidential commutation divests the courts of authority over a sentence,
the Sixth, Ninth, and First Circuits all lean toward the conclusion that the
court is not divested of authority to entertain collateral attacks on original,
judicially imposed sentences. Thus, should the Supreme Court of the
United States be confronted with this question, the weight of case law
would most likely lead the Court to conclude that so long as the commuted
sentence is not disturbed (unless for constitutional reasons), the courts are
not divested of authority over the defendant’s sentence. If this conclusion
were to become the law of the land, there would be serious implications
as to how the clemency power should be exercised.
The FSA was well-intentioned but commuting an entire class of
inmates will lead to the courts still hearing collateral attacks of original
sentences. Such class commutations leave many cases only partially
remedied and do not address collateral attack issues such as
constitutionality of the original sentence or issues with the original trial.
So, while indeed many inmates’ sentences will be shortened, some
inmates may still continue to serve sentences that were unlawful in the
first place.
The solution is unclear. Scholars suggest the creation of a Presidential
Clemency Board that would be made up of members of Congress:
The hope is that the creation of such a Board would establish a system that
is agile enough to respond to those situations where the public interest
demands a pardon, responsive enough to allow deserving offenders the
opportunity to receive clemency, and accountable enough to the electorate
to deter corruption.119

Such a board would give federal offenders personal attention, catering
the commutation to the constitutionality of the original sentence. The
pressure from their constituents would urge these members of Congress
to give more specific scrutiny to each offender. The opportunity for more
in-depth scrutiny would decrease the likelihood that collateral attacks are
needed:
Because members of Congress are more accessible to citizens, increasing
their formal role in the pardoning process would grant an individual with a
119. See Menitove, supra note 28, at 448.
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sympathetic case a greater opportunity to be heard.120

While neither the Congress-funded, Department of Justice-housed
Pardon Attorney nor the potential solution of the Presidential Clemency
Board is perfect, the Presidential Clemency Board would most likely be
more efficient. Taking clemency review out of the hands of unelected
bureaucrats and into the hands of elected congressional officials would
increase accountability and hopefully speed up the clemency process
through the added sense of urgency coming from a congressperson’s
constituency with regard to highly publicized individuals. Further, this
added accountability would decrease the likelihood that presidents would
abuse the clemency power. The Department of Justice is under the direct
control of the president, which may shine light on why those closest to
the president receive commutations or pardons, regardless of how
egregious their offenses.
Scholars have pointed out, though, that there are potential separation
of powers issues with delegating the review of clemency grants to the
legislative branch.121 For one, this strategy could be viewed as usurping
the executive branch’s plenary clemency power. But, so long as the
president makes the final decisions, there is no authority within the
Constitution that exclusively requires the executive branch to aid in
choosing whom to pardon and what sentence to commute. In fact, so long
as Congress does not restrict the president’s plenary power, there should
be no separation of powers conflict. The president would still be free to
pardon whom he or she pleases, even if the Presidential Clemency Board
did not specifically recommend the inmate. So long as the president’s
power remains plenary and the president makes the final decisions,
separation of powers is satisfied.
Overall, one of the main criticisms of the current clemency process is
that the president is detached from the inmate seeking relief, as is the
Office of the Pardon Attorney. The more personalized the clemency
process, the more likely the grant of clemency would address all issues
with the original sentence, such as catering the commutation to retroactive
application of new sentencing standards.
IV. CONCLUSION
A presidential commutation of a criminal sentence does not divest the
courts of authority over the sentence. Justice requires that courts still be
free to hear collateral attacks of original sentences, especially if there is a

120. Id. at 459.
121. See Larkin, supra note 36, at 833.
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possibility that the inmate will have to serve even less time than the
presidentially commuted sentence. This is in line with the constitutional
doctrines of separation of powers and mootness. The president retains his
plenary power of executive clemency, while the judiciary may still
resolve mistakes the courts might have made. Each branch of government
retains its proper role.
This issue will continue to be at the forefront of politics as presidential
candidates and celebrities use their platforms to advocate for criminal
justice reform. Due to deeply rooted issues with America’s criminal
justice system, the public seemingly is recognizing just how important the
executive clemency power is to deliver justice for a handful of deserving
inmates.
In order to achieve more widespread change, Congress needs to not
only create new, fairer sentencing guidelines, but also needs to determine
an effective way to address those who are currently serving time under
unlawful sentences.
The Sixth Circuit properly concluded that a presidential commutation
of a criminal sentence does not divest the courts of authority over that
sentence. If more circuit courts follow suit, there would be less men and
women serving time under unlawful sentences in our criminal justice
system.
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